I. INTRODUCTION
In Washington v. Harper,' the United States Supreme Court reversed a Washington State Supreme Court decision 2 that required a judicial hearing before a prison inmate could be given antipsychotic drugs against his will.
3 The Harper Court determined that while a prison inmate retained a liberty interest in avoiding forced administration of antipsychotic drugs, 4 such treatment also served legitimate state interests. The Court further determined that the Washington State regulation governing involuntary treatment was related reasonably to the penological concerns asserted, 5 and provided adequate procedural protections under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
6
Confinement does not obliterate all constitutional rights; therefore, the finding that a prison inmate retains a liberty interest in avoiding antipsychotic drug treatment is consistent with past judicial policy. This Note argues that defining the liberty interest as "significant" rather than "fundamental" influenced the Court's ultimate decision in this case. The right to decide whether or not to take medication that chemically alters the mind and has potentially serious side effects is a fundamental liberty interest.
No liberty interest, though, is absolute; thus, in certain circumstances, a state's interests may outweigh an individual's liberty interest. This Note concludes that if the state's security and administrative concerns were inseverable from the state's obligation to provide medical treatment to a prison inmate, then the Washington regulation was related reasonably to legitimate penological con-separately, however, its conclusions arguably would have been different. First, viewed in isolation, neither asserted interest would have been legitimate; and second, the regulation would not have been reasonably related to either interest. This Note thus concludes that had the Court defined the interest as fundamental rather than significant, it readily could have concluded that the regulation was an exaggerated response to penological concerns.
Washington's challenged regulation called for a hearing committee to review a doctor's prescription of drug treatment when the inmate refused such treatment. This Note concludes that, although a judicial hearing may not cure the problem of bias among the hearing committee members because of deference given to professional judgment, it at least affords the individual more protection for his fundamental right than a potentially biased hearing committee would.
Finally, this Note argues that in the appropriate circumstances, requiring formal commitment proceedings, with their attendant procedural safeguards, would better protect the inmate's interests.
II. BACKGROUND

A. THE FACTS 7
Walter Harper was sentenced to the Washington State Penitentiary in Walla Walla for robbery." From 1976 to 1980, the state housed him in the mental health unit there. 9 During that time, he voluntarily underwent antipsychotic drug therapy. 10 The state paroled Harper in 1980, contingent upon participation in psychiatric treatment. 1 The state revoked his parole after he assaulted two
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Facts describe these procedures: a.
[A] prisoner may be involuntarily medicated only where he suffers from a mental disorder and as a result of which is either gravely disabled or presents a likelihood of serious harm to himself or others 24 b. Medications must be ordered by, or in emergencies, approved by a psychiatrist. Where the patient/prisoner refuses medication, a special hearing committee is convened, consisting of a psychiatrist, psychologist, and the Associate Superintendent of SOC. None of the committee members may be currently involved in treatment or diagnosis of the patient .... c. The prisoner has certain procedural rights prior to the hearing, including i. twenty-four hours notice, during which time he may not be medicated; ii. notice of the tentative diagnosis, factual basis for the diagnosis, and the basis on which medical treatment is necessary.
d. At the hearing the prisoner has the right to be present and present evidence; the institution is required to present its evidence; the inmate may present his own witnesses and cross examine the staff witnesses. The prisoner is also entitled to a lay advisor who has an understanding of the psychiatric issues in the case.
e.
[T]he prisoner has the right to appeal to the SOC Superintendent.
f. After-the initial hearing, involuntary medication can continue only with periodic reviews. 25 The Court further explained that when Harper was initially Justice White delivered the opinion for the Court, except on the issue of provision of a licensed attorney. Justice Powell delivered the opinion on this issue, concluding that a prison inmate is not constitutionally entitled to such counsel in a hearing for transfer to a mental hospital. Id. at 497-500.
24 "Mental disorder" means "any organic, mental or emotional impairment which has substantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or volitional functions." WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.020(2) (Supp. 1990).
"Gravely disabled" means a condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder: (a) [i]s in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for his essential human needs of health or safety, or (b) manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions and is not receiving such care as is essential for his or her health or safety.
Id. § 71.05.020(1).
"Likelihood of serious harm" means either (a) [a] substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon his own person, as evidenced by threats or attempts to commit suicide or inflict physical harm on one's self, (b) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon another, as evidenced by behavior which has caused such harm or which places another person or persons in reasonable fear of sustaining such harm, or (c) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon the property of others, as evidenced by behavior which has caused substantial loss or damage to the property of others. Id. § 71.05.020(3). 25 Findings of Fact, supra note 7, at B-3-4.
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW medicated the policy required the hearing committee to review its decision to medicate after seven days. If reapproved, medication could continue for fourteen days. At the end of the two week period, the policy required the treating psychiatrist to review the case and submit a report to the Department of Corrections Medical Director in Olympia for review. These fourteen day reviews continued as long as the patient was involuntarily medicated. The state amended SOC Policy 600.30 to allow a fourteen day initial treatment rather than a seven day period. If treatment continued for one hundred and eighty days, the state required the SOC to conduct a new hearing to consider the need for further treatment. 26 Finally, an inmate may obtain judicial review of the hearing committee's decision through either a personal restraint petition or a petition for an extraordinary writ.
27
Harper did not dispute that the state followed the SOC procedures. 28 Nevertheless, in February, 1985, 873, 876, 759 P.2d 358, 361 (1988) . 29 Joint Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990 . The Washington Supreme Court based its decision on due process grounds. The petition for certiorari only raised due process concerns; thus, the Court ignored equal protection and free speech claims and confined its analysis to due process issues. 110 S. Ct. at 1035 n.5. Justice Brachtenbach agreed with the trial court that Harper had a protected liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic drug treatment, but concluded that this interest required the highest level of protection. 33 The'court had previously ruled that refusal of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) was a fundamental liberty interest requiring a high level of protection. 4 The court found administering antipsychotic drugs, given their serious side-effects, no less intrusive than ECT.
5
Justice Brachtenbach did not agree, however, that the procedures of the SOC Policy 600.30 adequately protected this fundamental liberty interest. The court distinguished Vitek v. Jones, 3 6 which "concerned... the 'stigmatizing consequences' of a transfer to a mental health hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment consisting of a behavior modification program. 3 7 Because the involuntary ingestion of antipsychotic drugs raised the prospect of serious, potentially permanent side-effects, the court determined Harper's liberty interest required greater protection than that in Vitek. 3 8 The court held that involuntary antipsychotic drug treatment could be ordered by a court if, in a judicial hearing, the State "9proves (1) a compelling state interest to administer antipsychotic drugs, and (2) the administration of the drugs is both necessary and effective for furthering that interest." 39 The court remanded the case to the lower court to make specific findings with regard to the state's interest in the treatment, the necessity and effectiveness of the treatment, and the desires of the patient. 
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III. OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether ajudicial hearing was required before a state could treat a mentally ill prisoner with antipsychotic drugs against his will. Resolution of the issue required a discussion of the protections afforded a prisoner under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Court first determined that Harper did have a liberty interest in "avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs." 44 The Court reasoned that SOC Policy 600.30 allowed Harper to have an expectation that the drugs would not be arbitrarily administered. 45 According to Justice Kennedy, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment confirmed that expectation.
6
The inmate's right to refuse medication, however, is limited by the fact of his or her confinement. 4 7 Justice Kennedy explained that the limitation comes from considering the inmate's medical interests, given the legitimate needs of the institution. 48 The Court concluded that Harper retained a liberty interest in refusing the drugs, but that interest was not greater than that set forth in the state-created policy.
9
The Court applied the standard of review for prison regulations 41 Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 , 1032 (1990 Turning to the procedural protections necessary to protect
Harper's liberty interest in refusing the drug treatment, the Court held that SOC Policy 600.30 comported with procedural due process demands.
8
Taking into consideration the inmate's private interests, the government's interests, and the value of the procedural requirements, the Court first tackled the primary issue of whether or not a judicial hearing was required. 59 Recognizing that the due process clause never has required that the trier of fact be trained legally, 60 50 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (prison regulation concerning marriage held constitutionally invalid and another concerning inmate correspondence held constitutionally valid). 51 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (prison regulation concerning participation in religious service held constitutionally valid).
52 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 53 Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1038. The three relevant factors are as follows: (1) "'a "valid, rational connection" between the prison regulation and legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it,'" id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89); (2) the impact that accommodating the individual's constitutional right will have on the prison population and the allocation of resources, id (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90); and (3) 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW the Court concluded that medical personnel were better equipped to assess the necessity of medication, especially for the mentally ill.61 The Court reasoned that the prisoner's interests were protected, because the medical personnel must have determined the following: first, the inmate suffered from a mental disorder; and second, as a result of that disorder, he was dangerous to himself or others. 62 Because the decision was mainly a medical one, the Court held that a state may conclude that a judicial hearing would not be effective.
63
The Court further determined that SOC Policy 600.30 provided adequate procedural safeguards for the protection of the inmates interests. 64 Policy 600.30, without evidence to the contrary, provided for notice, the right of the prisoner to be present at the hearing, and the right to present and cross-examine witnesses. 6 5 The Court also was satisfied that the involvement of an independent lay advisor who understood the psychiatric issues would also provide sufficient protection.
66
The Court, in conclusion, found that the challenged regulation met the demands of the due process clause, because
[i]t is an accommodation between an inmate's liberty interests in avoiding the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs and the state's interests in providing appropriate medical treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate suffering from a serious mental disorder represents to himself or others.
6 7
B. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Stevens took issue with both the majority's definition of the liberty interest and what procedures were necessary to protect that liberty interest.
According to Justice Stevens, Harper's right to refuse antifrom bodily restraint; whether his rights had been adequately protected was a decision left to professionals and considered presumptively valid. 61 Id. at 1042-43. In addition to Parham, the Court relied on Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307 (1982) , to substantiate this conclusion. In Romeo, the Court held that children had a constitutional right to be free from confinement; therefore, in a parent's commitment application for the child, great deference was given to the professional in determining the child's medical needs. Id. 62 Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1042-43. 
960
[Vol. 81 psychotic drugs was fundamental. 68 The interest had two essential dimensions. The physical dimension stemmed from the desire to avoid the highly intrusive invasion of the drugs into the body, which could cause serious, potentially permanent, side effects. The intellectual dimension stemmed from our nation's most basic value, the right to be free in' thoughts, emotions, sensations, and beliefs. 69 Justice Stevens equated forced drugging with altering the will and the mind of the individual. 70 In defining the liberty interest, Justice Stevens, unlike Justice Kennedy, greatly emphasized Harper's adamant refusal of the drug treatment and the side effects he already was experiencing. 7 '
Justice Stevens agreed that a state interest 72 might be advanced to justify the deprivation of this liberty interest. 7 The majority said that providing the drugs in the medical interests of the inmate was a legitimate state interest. According to the dissent, however, the SOC policy failed on the majority's terms, because it did not require a finding that the drugs would benefit the inmate's medical condition. 74 The only justifications Justice Stevens found for the forced administration of the drugs were institutional and administrative concerns, especially prison security. 75 Although the state certainly had a legitimate interest in prison security, according to Justice Stevens, the Court misapplied the standard of review announced in Turner. 76 The dissent contended that the SOC policy was not related reasonably to the interest in security and management. Rather it was an exaggerated response to a legitimate purpose. 77 Id. at 1050 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent illustrated this by reference to another SOC policy for involuntary medication in emergency situations when the inmate poses a serious harm to himself and others. The policy is to medicate involuntarily the individual. According to Justice Stevens, the state makes no distinction between the emergency and non-emergency situations; thus, addressing security risks by forced use of antipsychotic drugs in a non-emergency situation was an "exaggerated response" to that concern. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) .
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Justice Stevens' main objection to Justice Kennedy's analysis was its failure to consider separately the asserted justifications for forced medication-the inmate's medical interests and the security concerns. 78 According to Justice Stevens, the majority opinion resulted in a "muddled rationale" combining state and individual medical interests which, in the end, only protected institutional concerns at the expense of the inmate's "substantive" liberty interest. 7 9 In the dissent's eyes, the Court fared no better in considering what procedures were necessary to protect the liberty interest. 8 0 Justice Stevens objected that the members of the hearing committee were not disinterested parties for several reasons. 8 ' First, the panel members had to review the work of treating physicians-their colleagues-and, on subsequent occasions, those very panel members' work might be before another hearing committee. Such a system forced colleagues to sit in judgment of one another. 8 2 Second, the policy only proscribed the attending physician from participating in the initial seven day medication approval. 8 3 Third, the composition of the committee ensured that its decisions were biased toward institutional concerns. 8 4 Finally, all the other procedural "safeguards" seemed to be geared toward institutional concerns. 8 5 In sum, the dissent objected to the institutional concerns that plagued the decision to administer antipsychotic drugs, with seemingly little regard for the inmate's medical interest, thus depriving an inmate of a fundamental liberty interest.
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A.
THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
The Supreme Court recognized that the question of whether a prisoner is entitled to a judicial hearing before antipsychotic drugs 84 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Only one member of the three person committee is trained and licensed to prescribe antipsychotic drugs, and one member has no medical expertise at all. In addition, appeals are made to the SOC superintendent. Id. at 1053-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 1055 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The committee need not consider less intrusive measures or the severity of the medication being prescribed. The hearing is only for the seven day initial period and the inmate has no opportunity to object to the decision to medicate on a long-term basis. Id. at 1054-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting) . The definition of liberty interests apparently is left to the discretion of the Court. The majority in Harper defined the liberty interest at issue as significant, but recognized that the right was no greater than that defined by the state. 8 9 However, the dissent defined it as a "fundamental liberty interest deserving the highest order of protection." 90 Without an objective means for deciding between these two definitions, neither approach can be wrong. 
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Given the importance of the individual's decision about medical care, though, the latter definition makes more sense. The Washington legislature created a liberty interest to which Harper was entitled; namely, the reasonable expectation that unwanted antipsychotic drugs would not be administered indiscriminately. Even though the state liberty interest may not exist under the federal constitution, the Supreme Court nonetheless recognizes state created liberty interests and requires procedural protections for said interests. 9 '
In Harper, the state created liberty interest also existed under the due process clause. 9 2 If a state policy creates a liberty interest but provides less protection than the federal constitution would provide, then the policy will be declared unconstitutional. Thus, how the Court defines the liberty interest protected by the constitution is crucial. Harper's constitutional right to refuse drugs required greater protection than Policy 600.30 afforded, because it was a fundamental liberty interest requiring the highest order of protection, and prison bars did not affect the fundamental nature of the interest.
It is well established that, although deprived of freedom, a prisoner retains his or her constitutional rights, 93 including the right to due process of law. 94 However, the majority could not find that Harper retained a fundamental liberty interest, because it did not isolate the liberty interest from the needs of the institution.
9 5 Justice Kennedy failed to support why a prisoner's right under the due process clause "must be defined in the context of the inmate's confinement." 96 On the other hand, the dissent argued that the majority ignored the "physical" and "intellectual" dimensions of the liberty interest, because it not only failed to consider the serious and potentially permanent injury, even early death the drugs can cause, but it also overrode "a competent person's choice to reject a specific form of medical treatment. 
964
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Conflicting assessments of the scientific data concerning the risks and benefits of antipsychotic drug treatment influenced Justice Kennedy's and Justice Stevens' definitions of the liberty interest, and therefore, how each ultimately decided the issue. Prescribing antipsychotic drugs to an inmate against his will presented a novel issue for the Court, but weighing the risks and benefits of antipsychotic drugs did not. 98 The courts' assessments of risks and benefits have not been consistent. 99 1317 (1990) . In Charters, the federal government had committed a prison inmate involuntarily to a psychiatric hospital. The trial court declared the inmate was incompetent to stand trial because of the danger he posed to himself and others. Without accepting a particular assessment of drug treatment, the Fourth Circuit held that the inmate did retain a liberty interest, but the decision to medicate against the patient's will was at base a medical one and did not require judicial approval. See also Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1214 (1985) . A pretrial detainee, while in jail, challenged the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs. The plaintiff had been found competent to stand trial. The court recognized that the pretrial detainee retains a liberty interest in refusing unwanted drugs. Because of the potentially serious side-effects, the Tenth Circuit held that the state's security interest could only overcome the inmate's interest if less restrictive alternatives were considered. It further held that extended medication may represent an exaggerated response to the legitimate state purpose of security. See also Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983). In Klein, the Third Circuit concluded that mentally ill patients committed involuntarily to state institutions retain a constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic drugs. Only after the patient is found to endanger himself or others can professionals make the decision to involuntarily medicate. The decision is presumed valid unless it is shown to be a substantial departure from accepted professionaljudgment. 
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latter on behalf of Harper. The diametrically opposed views of these two associations illustrate the depth of professional disagreement.
It is undisputed that antipsychotic drugs are important to the treatment of mental disorders. 1 0 0 It is also undisputed that antipsychotic drug treatment can result in potentially serious and, in some cases, permanent side-effects.' 0 The dispute arises in weighing the benefits and risks.10 2 Without commenting on the relative success of drug treatment or the relative gravity of side-effects, the following attempts to sketch the two sides of the issue.
Antipsychotic drugs have been used widely to treat psychoses, particularly schizophrenia. ' 0 3 The chemical effect is to clear hallucinations and delusions produced by the psychoses. This, in turn, provides stability, facilitates therapy, and reduces hospitalization.10 Some experts have gone as far as to suggest that the drugs "reinforce the most important aspects of mental functioning" and have a normalizing effect.' 0 5 However, it is also undisputed that serious side effects exist.
The side-effects of antipsychotic drugs include dystonia, a severe involuntary spasm of the upper throat, tongue or eyes; akathe- 102 Accounting for the biases of the two professional associations is beyond the scope of this article. However, it is not unreasonable to assume a certain inclination on the part of psychiatrists to view mental disorders as organic, thereby favoring the use of drugs, and for psychologists to concentrate on the social and mental aspects of the disease, thereby disdaining the use of drugs in favor of an alternative method of treatment. This debate is not likely to be settled in the near future.
103 APCA Brief, supra note 101, at 11 (citing Kane, Treatment of Schizophrenia, 13 SCHIZ-OPHRENIA BULL. 133 (1987 
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ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS 967 sia, the inability to remain still, restlessness and agitation; and pseudo-Parkinsonism manifested by a mask-like face, drooling, muscle rigidity, stiffness, tremors and a shuffling gait. Nausea, skin rashes, dry mouth, congestion, diminished energy, suppression of personality, vomiting, diarrhea, blurred vision, nocturnal confusion, tremors and spasms have also been attributed to the use of antipsychotic drugs.' 0 l Liver damage, changes in heart rate (including cardiac arrest), convulsions, neuroleptic malignant syndrome (which often leads to death), 0 7 and tardive dyskinesia are considered the most severe side effects.' 0 8
Harper was first diagnosed as suffering from manic-depressive disorder; subsequently, he was thought to have schizo-affective disorder. The diagnosis at the time of the trial was schizophrenia. 1 0 9 He received voluntarily and involuntarily Trialafon, Haldol, Prolixin, Taractan, Loxitane, Mellaril, and Navane. 10 As a result, Harper exhibited symptoms of acute dystonic reaction and akathesia. 1 ' He did not exhibit symptoms of tardive dyskinesia.
12
The state and its amici argued that Harper's drug treatment was positive and rehabilitating. Harper, because of his mental illness, had a tendency toward assaultive behavior which was reduced with drug treatment." 5 Recall that Harper was unmedicated when he was paroled. The state revoked his parole after he assaulted two nurses. 1 4 In contrast, Harper and his amici argued that his chance of suffering from tardive dyskinesia was greater than one in four, given the length of time he had been taking these drugs." 5 The APLA charged that the APCA relied on reports rendered obsolete 106 APLA Brief at 6-9, supra note 100, and accompanying footnotes. 108 APLA Brief, supra note 100, at 7-8 (citing PHYsIcIAN's DESK REFERENCE (43d ed. 1989)). Most of the controversy centers on the severity of tardive dyskinesia, the likelihood of its manifestation, its permanence, and treatment for it.
Tardive dyskinesia is characterized by bizarre, uncontrollable movements of the face (lip smacking, chewing, protruding tongue, grimacing) and similar rhythmic, involuntary movements of the trunk, arms and legs. At times it occurs in a mild form, but its more serious form can include severe physical and other effects [including severe respiratory complications, persistent vomiting; psychological disturbances such as anxiety, guilt, depression and even suicide].
Id.
109 Findings of Facts, supra note 7, at B-5. by more recent research that indicated the following: (1) the prevalency of tardive dyskinesia had increased; (2) it was impossible to predict which patients would develop the disorder; (3) the chances of development increased the longer the patient stayed on the medication; (4) and the disorder was reversible in only one-third of the patients that suffered from it. 116 The APLA also charged that there was a high rate of misdiagnosis of the disorder, mistaking symptoms to be caused by the mental disorder itself, and that antipsychotic drugs were being administered indiscriminately.' 1 7
Harper demonstrates that the conflicting body of information can lead to different definitions of the liberty interest. Dwelling on the curative effects of the drugs, Justice Kennedy focused on how the drugs benefitted Harper. It was unnecessary for Justice Kennedy, therefore, to separate the needs of the prison from Harper's interest; they were one and the same. Defining the interest as "significant" was plausible. On the other hand, by considering why Harper refused the drugs, Justice Stevens separated Harper's interest from the concerns of the prison. The serious physical and mental intrusion of these drugs strongly supported Justice Stevens' conviction that the interest was fundamental, and prison bars should not alter that fact.
Defining the interest, though, is just one step in the court's judgment. A prison regulation that conflicts with a liberty interest will be subjected to the same test, 1 18 regardless of whether the interest is defined as "fundamental," "substantial," or "significant."
Competing State Interests
The Court was not willing to find that Harper had an absolute liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic drugs. 119 Thus, regardless of whether or not Harper's interest was fundamental, the Court had to consider the competing state interest. Even the dissent recognized that " [t] he State clearly has a legitimate interest in prison security and administrative convenience that encompasses responding to potential risks to persons and property."' 120 The Court must balance the individual's interest against the state's interest.
116 APLA Brief, supra note 100, at 8. 117 Id. at 9-14.
118 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) . 119 The fourteenth amendment states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. While debate over the meaning of these words has raged for over one hundred years, we would be hard pressed to think of any interest, including a life interest, that is absolute. 
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Protection of inmates' rights is a relatively new phenomenon. 121 Movement away from the "hands-off"' 12 2 doctrine was inspired by the courts' recognition of criminal defendants' constitutional rights prior to conviction. 123 Once courts recognized criminal defendants' rights, it seemed inconsistent not to recognize the rights of those convicted and incarcerated. The expansion of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claims to prison inmates provided the inmates with the means to force the courts to address their rights.
124
Protection of prisoners' rights, though, largely is inconsistent with the long-standing policy of deference to administrative officials (police and prison authorities). The Supreme Court thus only considered the prisoner's rights within the context of his or her confinement. 125 The extent to which officials would be given deference, though, remained unclear.
Clarification 211, 212-13 (1980) ).-122 The "hands-off" doctrine refers to the judicial refusal ofjurisdiction for prisoners' claims. Courts have relied on three primary rationales to support their position of nonintervention: 1) the possibility that intervention would violate the separation of powers doctrine; 2) lack of judicial expertise regarding penology; and 3) the fear that intervention by the courts would subvert prison discipline. Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 181 (1970) [hereinafter Goldfarb] .
123 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) The Turner Court delineated several factors relevant to making this determination: (1) there "must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it;" (2) "whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to inmates;" (3) consideration of "the impact-accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally;" and (4) the absence of ready alternatives.
12 9
Recognizing that SOC Policy 600.30 impinged upon a liberty interest, the Harper Court considered whether or not the regulation was related reasonably to legitimate penological concerns. The Court identified the legitimate state interests as "combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others.., in a prison environment" and the state's "obligation to provide prisoners with medical treatment consistent not only with their own medical interest, but also with the needs of the institution."' ' 3 0 Justice Kennedy concluded that the policy was a "rational means of furthering the State's legitimate objectives."' Justice Stevens' objected to the majority's conclusions. He wrote:
The flaw in Washington's Policy 600.30-and the basic error in the Court's opinion today-is the failure to divorce from each other the two justifications for forced medication and to consider the extent to which the Policy is reasonably related to either interest. 135 The only evidence that the Policy called for a medical determination was that the individual had to be suffering from a mental disorder-a medical decision in itself.
The question of whether a medical decision was being made is more complicated than either Justice suggested. Ostensibly, the medical determination of mental illness was made prior to the state's decision to medicate involuntarily (i.e., the state transferred Harper to the SOC because he suffered from a mental disorder). Harper was at the SOC to be rehabilitated to the point when he could be returned to the regular correctional facility to serve the rest of his sentence. The decision to use drugs may be a medical one,' 3 6 but the state made this decision primarily to serve an institutional concern and not necessarily because it was the treatment of preference for curing Harper's medical illness. This subtle distinction is extremely important in determining if the Court properly applied the standard of review for prison regulations. If the "legitimate" interest in providing medical treatment is nonexistent, 134 Id. at 1039. 135 Id. at 1048-49. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Policy 600.30 requires: "In order for involuntary medication to be approved, it must be demonstrated that the inmate suffers from a mental disorder and as result of that disorder constitutes a likelihood of serious harm to himself or others and/or is gravely disabled." The dissent refused to accept that a medical determination was implicit in the policy, for the drug could not be administered unless the state found that the inmate suffered from a mental illness. Id.
136 In Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), the Court intimated that a decision to administer forcibly drugs when the patient poses a threat to himself or others may be a medical one given that, under the Constitution a doctor may make this decision in the case of involuntarily committed mentally ill patients. 1119 (1982) ). The Third Circuit held that the decision to medicate only after the patient is found to endanger himself or others is a medical one and does not violate due process.
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Regardless of whether a legitimate state interest in providing medical treatment existed, had the Court separated the analysis of the two distinct state interests, as it did in Turner, 1 3 7 the regulation would have been invalid. 13 8 The drugs administered to Harper have been shown to alleviate many of the symptoms that manifest themselves as dangerous activity and have undisputed therapeutic benefits, but it was obvious that Harper did not think the drug treatment was in his best interest.
13 9 At least one court has suggested that the prison's obligation to provide medication when the inmate refuses is not a legitimate state interest: 1 40 True, the jail is under a constitutional duty to treat the medical needs of pretrial detainees.., and such treatment includes mental as well as physical disorders .... The premise underlying this duty is that the state may not deliberately fail to provide necessary medical treatment when it is desired by the detainee. Medical treatment is designed to ensure that the conditions of pretrial detention do not amount to the imposition of punishment.... This constitutional requirement cannot be turned on its head to mean that if a competent individual chooses not to undertake the risks or pains of a potentially dangerous treatment, the jail may force him to accept it. Absent legitimate government objectives . . . we believe that involuntary medication may itself amount to unconstitutional punishment.141
The entire Harper Court found that security concerns for the inmates, others and property, constituted legitimate state interests. If drug treatment decreases the danger that the inmate poses, as a matter ofjudgment, one could draw the conclusion that forced drug treatment is related rationally to the desired goal of security. As a 137 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-99 (1987) . 138 Justice Stevens found, when applying the Turner test to the state's security interest, that the policy failed as an "overexaggerated response." Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1050 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The basis for this conclusion was that another SOC Policy permitting involuntary medication on an emergency basis was triggered by an imminent danger of injury. In contrast, Policy 600.30 was triggered by illness-induced injury or property damage, evidenced by past behavior, and allowed for prolonged periods of medication. Involuntary medication, then, was the response to two distinct penological concerns, according to justice Stevens. Justice Stevens failed to explain why responding to both concerns by medicating involuntarily was so outlandish, especially considering that a hearing was involved in the case of prolonged medication and probably not in the case of an emergency. To buttress the conclusion that Policy 600.30 failed the Turner test, Justice Stevens pointed to ready alternatives. Id. at 1051 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He suggested segregation, standard disciplinary sanctions, and treatment with other drugs, such as tranquilizers. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139 Id. 1046 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting 
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ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS matter ofjudgment, though, given the intrusive nature of the drugs, forced treatment should be viewed as an exaggerated response. Justice Stevens' argument that involuntary drug treatment responds to more than one penological concern is not novel.142 Justice Stevens likely is objecting to the Turner test itself, which he originally rejected in his Turner dissent.' 43 In Turner, he joined the Court's opinion regarding invalidation of the prison's marriage regulation, which was viewed as an exaggerated response to institutional concerns. 4 4 Justice Stevens seemed anxious in Harper to use the "exaggerated response" rationale to validate the reasonable relation test as a means of protecting the individual's interests. Whether we separate the state's interests or not, one can argue that the regulation could be seen as an exaggerated response to the state's legitimate institutional concerns.
Whether or not the Justices viewed the regulation as an exaggerated response reflects their definitions of the liberty interest. The dissent's charge that the majority failed to put each interest separately through the reasonable relation test may be correct, but the Court ultimately would have upheld the regulation as valid. The Turner Court invalidated the marriage regulation after it determined that the right to marry was no less fundamental 45 for the prison inmate than it was for the civilian. 146 The majority in Harper would not recognize the inmate's right to refuse antipsychotic drugs as fundamental, but rather insisted on considering the liberty interest
